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Reluctance to Report Criminal Incidents: Limited Access to Justice, Social Exclusion, and Gender[1]

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Abstract

Measures of access to justice mainly use indicators from judicial statistics or legislation whereas subjective perceptions or attitudes are often measured by survey questions related to judicial services. Using Turkey's Life Satisfaction Survey, we consider reluctance to report an experienced criminal incident, which is a factual statement, as an objective indicator affecting demand for and access to justice. We identify correlates of reluctance to report and find that socio-economic status has a negative impact on the probability of reporting a criminal incident, and that the impact is greater for women. Perceived social pressures related to gender and level of income adversely affect probability of reporting whereas men are not affected by social pressure to report criminal incidents. We then relate the probability of reluctance to report to the probability of giving a no opinion response to questions on perceptions of satisfaction with judicial services. We find that the two are correlated, providing evidence for the relationship between exclusion from access to justice and voice.

Keywords Access to justice, life satisfaction survey, social exclusion, gender

JEL classification O12, Z13, K10, C21, C31

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1 Introduction

Alongside access to education and health, access to justice is a primary determinant of greater equity and efficiency. Economic and social development require equal opportunities to legal protection as the basis of the rule of law. North et al. (2009) historically identify the rule of law for elites as one of the conditions of the transition from a 'limited access order' to an 'open access order'. They argue that the rule of law was expanded to the rest of the population in many Western societies after the Second World War, which contributed to consolidating open access orders. Access to justice enhances voice, accountability, and contract enforcement, which contribute to greater economic and political efficiency. Equal access to justice also reduces exclusion and discrimination based on gender, race, religious beliefs, age, disability, and socio-economic status (e.g., material assets, employment status, and residential locality), which increases equity, efficiency, and societal well-being. According to the United Nations (2021), "[a]ccess to justice is a basic principle of the rule of law. In the absence of access to justice, people cannot have their voice heard, exercise their rights, challenge discrimination or hold decision-makers accountable". Similarly, the World Justice Project argues that the rule of law and access to justice are major contributors to a well-functioning liberal democracy: access to justice is "a fundamental component of rule of law, and the failure of justice systems to meet justice needs compounds inequality, erodes trust in institutions, and renders societies vulnerable to a populist backlash against core rule of law norms, as we see in too many parts of the world today" (World Justice Project, 2019). The right to justice is now widely recognized, such as in the UN's Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions; Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice; in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and in several other international, regional and national texts.

Quantitative measurement of access to justice can be carried out from different perspectives. Much of the empirical literature relies on indicators related to judicial services information, such as administrative data and court records (Albiston & Sandefur, 2013; Voigt, 2016). These indicators can either proxy formal (de jure) rules or de facto outcomes that affect both supply of and demand for judicial services. Supply side information include written and formal rules regulating the functioning judicial services provision and processes, versus outcomes, such as judicial statistics on caseload, duration of litigation or court delays, proximity of judicial services providers, court fees, and the preferences and incentives of prosecutors and judges that shape decision making (Posner, 1993). Marciano et al. (2019) emphasize the distinction between de jure and de facto measurement, and discuss the difficulties and importance of constructing de facto quantitative indicators. Measurement of demand side, non-legal, factors are usually limited in scope either because samples only cover beneficiaries or users (i.e., those who effectively accessed justice) or individuals that could access justice but for some reasons do not with specifically designed surveys with small samples that are not usually representative at the national level.

Large sample, nationally representative surveys from the demand perspective are, at best, surveys that include direct or indirect attitude questions of trust, perception, or satisfaction with the judiciary, rule of law, or quality of government, such as the World Values Survey, Gallup Poll, Life Satisfaction Survey, European Social Survey, or European Quality of Life Survey. Such surveys actually measure subjective evaluations or perceptions rather than

objective actual experiences. More refined indicators can be constructed from surveys measuring the perceptions of citizens and qualified people (field experts and practitioners) on outcomes, such as the World Justice Project and World Governance Indicators).[2]

Turkey is an upper-middle-income country (World Bank classification) and a member of IMF's G20 grouping. However, in terms of rule of law and its components, its performance is poorer. Table 1 gives Turkey's percentile ranking for per capita GNI and rule of law. For 2014, its criminal justice ranking had the largest gap to GNI while its rankings in justice indicators have significantly deteriorated in recent years. According to the WJP rule of law indicator, Turkey's overall rule of law index ranking decreased from 40.4 in 2014 to 14.4 in 2020 while the WGI decreased from 57.2 in 2014 to 44.7 in 2019. Regarding regime type, Turkey ranked third (after Poland and Hungary) among the ten most autocratizing countries in 2010-2020, according to the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. According to the Polity2 index of the Polity V Project, Turkey has changed from a democracy (1983-2013), to an open anocracy (2014-2015), and then a closed anocracy (2016-2018).

Table 1: Selected aggregate indicators for per capita GNI, justice, and rule of law

	2014	2019/2020
WGI - Rule of Law	57.2	44.7
WJP - Overall Score (Rule of law)	40.4	16.4
WJP - Factor 7: Civil Justice	52.5	19.5
WJP - Factor 8: Criminal Justice	37.4	33.6
WDI - GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)	65.8	63.2

Turkey's percentile rank among all countries covered by the indicator: 0 = lowest and 100 = highest.
Sources: World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Justice Project (WJP), World Development Indicators.

It is not easy to find non-perceptual objective indicators of the general population's experiences, or lack thereof, with the judiciary. Nation-wide household surveys conducted by national statistical institutions usually lack questions about access to and demand for justice. Instead, a socio-legal approach can address these questions, which affect not only attitudes but also behavior and access to justice of potential and/or effective beneficiaries.[3]

[2] The World Governance Indicators are aggregate indicators that "combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms" (World Bank, 2021). The World Justice Project aims to "present an image that accurately portrays the rule of law as experienced by ordinary people, each score of the Index is calculated using a large number of questions drawn from two original data sources collected by the World Justice Project in each country: a General Population Poll (GPP) and a series of Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (QRQs)" (World Justice Project, 2018). Other historical evaluations of polities are directly assessed by country experts (e.g., the Polity V Project of the Center for Systemic Peace, Varieties of Democracy). Among others, cross-country data with detailed administrative information on judicial systems and services comes from the Council of Europe European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) and the Strategy for Harmonization of Statistics for Africa (SHaSA)'s Governance, Peace and Security Surveys (GPS). For a recent and comprehensive assessment of available data, see Praia Group on Governance Statistics – UN Statistical Commission (2020).

[3] In practice, the vulnerable population that is unlikely to access justice is identified through indicators of social, economic, and cultural indicators (OECD, 2019 provides examples).

One way to understand limited access is to look at people's willingness to take potentially justiciable experiences to court. Studies show that, alongside factors affecting supply and demand for the judicial services mentioned above, non-judicial factors also make people more reluctant to take legal action.[4] There are various explanations for such behavior, ranging from lack of capabilities in identifying the potentially legal aspect that defines the experience as justiciable to choosing alternative, private forms of conflict resolution.

Using Turkey's 2013 Life Satisfaction Survey,[5] we exploit questions about the respondents' exposure to criminal incidents and whether they reported such incidents. The information related to the decision to report a criminal incident is a factual statement of an explicitly recognizable and justiciable experience. This proxies for an unbiased, demand-side measurement of intentionally not resorting to the justice system, given that the first step to start the judicial process following a criminal incident is to report it. We then identify the characteristics of individuals who do not report an experienced criminal incident, i.e. who chose not to access justice despite incidence, and thus identify non-legal factors that impede resorting to justice.

We then try to understand the particularly high incidence of no opinion responses to questions about perceptions of and satisfaction with the judicial system. If respondents do not explicitly state an opinion, this may be purely due to neglect, unconcern, or indifference[6] which can be considered random behavior. Consequently, these responses are often coded as missing. However, such responses may also be non-random and correlated with survey and interviewer characteristics, the type of question (e.g., complex or sensitive), and respondent characteristics determining an ignorant, disinterested or ambivalent attitude. Meitinger & Johnson (2020) review the causes of item nonresponse (INR).[7] These can be analyzed from various perspectives: the interviewer (speed of surveying, job experience, gender, socio-economic characteristics with respect to the respondent, etc.); the survey technology and conditions (e.g., self-administered, distance - phone, digital - versus face to face, presence of other household members, etc.); and the respondent (gender, age, income, ethnicity, socio-economic and cultural environment, etc.). These factors are likely to be more relevant and significant for sensitive and/or complex questions. Given the scope and characteristics of our data, we limit our analysis to the respondent perspective.
Survey questions related to political and civic attitudes towards government are particularly prone to INR. Unsurprisingly, in the LSS we analyze, no opinion responses to questions about

[4] This issue is analyzed in the early study of the Civil Litigation Project's report, based on a comprehensive survey designed from a socio-legal perspective (Trubek et al., 1983).
[5] The 2013 survey is the only one representative at a provincial level, which allows control of Turkey's vast inter-provincial heterogeneities (notably ethno-cultural): "Geographic detail: The survey results were published in total of Turkey, rural and urban details until 2013. For the first time in 2013, the results were published at the provincial level for the calculation of well-being index for provinces. Since 2014, the survey results have been published in Turkey." (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2021).
[6] The literal translation of the response option in the survey is 'I have no opinion', which can be considered equivalent to the 'don't know' (DK) response option. Note that both no opinion and don't know options may be available, in which case the don't know response may be closer to lacking knowledge while the no opinion answer is closer to an ambivalent or indifferent attitude. Some surveys also provide a 'refusal' option for questions that are cognitively challenging or sensitive. Shoemaker et al. (2002) find that refusals and don't know answers (referred to collectively as 'item nonresponse' - INR) are associated respectively with unwillingness (or reluctance) and insufficient cognitive capability to report an opinion. In the survey, we use the only available option of 'no opinion', which may reflect all these attitudes.
[7] For pioneering work, see Converse (1970).

the judicial system and services are particularly frequent, which suggests a non-random pattern. Callens & Loosveldt (2018) use the 2010 European Social Survey (ESS)'s one time module to identify determinants of INR for questions about trust in the police and the criminal courts. They find that, besides demographic factors, there are also substantial effects of interviewer and survey technology: greater interviewer training, experience, and motivation, and computer-assisted personal interviewing rather than paper-and-pencil interviewing decrease the incidence of 'don't know' answers.

Consequently, our contribution is twofold. First, we identify the determinants of effective demand for justice by minimizing the potential impact of factors like cognitive requirements, costs, and availability of judicial services. Second, we relate this issue to the INR literature to determine whether not accessing justice is correlated with not voicing perceptions and attitudes. Regarding the first contribution, we exploit the cognitively less challenging behavior of reporting or not reporting a criminal incident in assessing demand for justice. For the second, we try to understand whether there is a relationship between reluctance to report and having 'no opinion' about satisfaction with the judicial system and services. This would imply marginalization defined as exclusion or reluctance to reveal preference (level of satisfaction), i.e. that the no opinion response is non-random. To this end, we run bivariate probit estimations with each of the three questions on perception of judicial services and reluctance to report. We find that the characteristics of the two groups of respondents are correlated. In the following section, we present the data and our estimation strategy, and then discuss our results. In the last section, we conclude our findings.

2 Data

We think that data on the decision to report exposure to a criminal event has several advantages in allowing us to assess access to justice from the demand side. First, it is an individual decision rather than a perception, given that a criminal event has happened. Second, exposure to crime provides an explicit motivation to potentially report the event to the police or gendarmerie, who are the first bodies of authority in the judicial process of criminal events in Turkey. Third, although many studies in advanced economies privilege access to civil justice, access to criminal justice may also be an issue in many societies. In 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems. This recognized "that legal aid is an essential element of a fair, humane and efficient criminal justice system that is based on the rule of law and that it is a foundation for the enjoyment of other rights, including the right to a fair trial, as a precondition to exercising such rights and an important safeguard that ensures fundamental fairness and public trust in the criminal justice process" (United Nations, 2013). Fourth, whereas the resolution of conflicts that could lead to civil litigation may not be reported because of difficulties in defining it in legal terms, criminal events are more straightforward and are less likely to remain unidentified due to cognitive difficulty. In other words, non-access captured by reluctance to report is most likely to capture an intentional refusal of access whereas not going to court in possible civil cases is more likely to be unintentional. Finally, public order services are much more widespread and their access is less costly.

Our sample for the first estimation is restricted to respondents exposed to any criminal event

during the time of the survey. We identify our dependent variable using eight survey questions (Table 2) related to criminal exposure. After each question, the respondent is asked "Did you resort to the police/gendarmerie for this incident?" Our Q1 dummy variable is defined as having experienced at least one of the eight experiences. If the respondent's answer is yes to one or more of the questions below and that they also say that they reported it, Q1 takes the value of one, and zero otherwise. The different incidents are burglary; snatching or pickpocketing; extortion; injury or assault; ill-treatment by a family member; blackmail or threat; sexual crime; swindling; other types of criminal incidents. Among those experiencing at least one criminal incident, 56% reported the incident to the police or gendarmerie while 44% did not.

We should also note that the incidence rates for the eight types of criminal events is low, which also requires further discussion. These figures probably do not reflect true victimization rates. For example, the very low incidence rate for sexual victimization can be attributed to reluctance to admit the experience. There may be a cultural bias regarding victimization rates that is very hard to eliminate in our case. Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations of the eight types of criminal events with gender, household size, and years of education. Regarding reluctance to report the incident, we would expect the correlations to be significantly negative. However, this is true in only two cases, which are also only weakly significant. Thus, there is no clear association between the variables.

Tables 4 and 5 present the questions about perceptions of the judicial system (Q2, Q3, and Q4), which are the alternative dependent variables in our second estimation. These are related to perceptions of fairness and impartiality, the judicial process, and general satisfaction with judicial services. The incidence of no opinion responses is particularly high for these questions: at least 50% for Q2 and Q3, and 33% for Q4. We assign the value of one to a no opinion response and zero otherwise. This comparison allows us to assess the relationship between reluctance to report and probability of having no opinion. Such a relation would imply that having no opinion actually corresponds to marginalization or exclusion. Table 6 presents the control variables to assess the impact of various types of social pressures. For each variable, we recode the response never as 0 and assign the other three responses (sometimes, often, and always) the value of 1.

As Table 7 shows, the province-level variation of the dependent variables is extremely high. The frequencies for reporting an incident (Q1) range from 17.7% to 85.7%% while the frequencies of no opinion answers (for Q2, Q3 and Q4) range from 9.1% to 77.8%.

Table 2: Questions related to exposure to criminal incident

Ql: Experienced any criminal incident (8 separate questions)		Experienced any incident Mean Std. Dev.		Reported to the police Mean Std. Dev.	
		Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
1	Have you experienced burglary snatching, or pickpocketing?	0.0234	0.1511	0.329	0.47
2	Have you experienced extortion?	0.0017	0.0413	0.283	0.451
3	Have you experienced any injuries or assaults?	0.0030	0.0547	0.255	0.436
4	Have you experienced ill-treatment by any of your family members?	0.0043	0.0653	0.652	0.477
5	Have you experienced blackmail or threats for any reason?	0.0043	0.0651	0.426	0.495
6	Have you experienced victimization due to sexual crimes?	0.0009	0.0298	0.546	0.499
7	Have you experienced victimization due to swindling?	0.0066	0.0813	0.512	0.5
8	Have you experienced any victimization for any other reason than these?	0.0047	0.0683	0.591	0.492
Ql:	Experienced any of the listed victimizations	0.04231	0.20129	0.56	0.496

Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 3: Correlations of criminal incidents with demographic variables

		Female	Household Size	Years of schooling
1	Have you experienced burglary snatching, or pickpocketing?	-0.0102	0.0848*	-0.0813*
2	Have you experienced extortion?	-0.1843*	0.0191	0.0746
3	Have you experienced any injuries or assaults?	-0.0228	0.0454	0.1006
4	Have you experienced ill-treatment by any of your family members?	0.0171	0.0552	-0.0601
5	Have you experienced blackmail or threats for any reason?	-0.0467	-0.0157	0.0335
6	Have you experienced victimization due to sexual crimes?	0.019	-0.0971	0.1774
7	Have you experienced victimization due to swindling?	-0.0391	0.0152	-0.0281
8	Have you experienced any victimization for any other reason than these?	-0.0224	0.1419*	0.046

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 4: Questions related to problems in the judicial system

		No	Some	Many	No opinion
Q2: Generally, related to the courts and judicial system, is there any problem with the fair and impartial application of laws to all individuals?	Mean	0.21	0.097	0.145	0.548
	Std. Dev.	0.408	0.295	0.352	0.498
Q3: Generally, related to the courts and judicial system, is there any problem in the judicial process?	Mean	0.23	0.115	0.093	0.562
	Std. Dev.	0.421	0.319	0.29	0.496

Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 5: Question related to satisfaction with the judicial system

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Moderate	Not satisfied	Not satisfied at all	No opinion
Q4: Are you satisfied with the judicial services?	Mean	0.027	0.505	0.058	0.061	0.018	0.331
	Std. Dev.	0.161	0.5	0.235	0.239	0.133	0.471

Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 6: Questions related to social pressure

		Never	Sometimes	Often	Always
Do you feel any social pressure due to your gender?	Mean	0.932	0.042	0.021	0.005
	Std. Dev.	0.252	0.201	0.142	0.073
Do you feel any social pressure due to your customs and traditions?	Mean	0.966	0.025	0.007	0.002
	Std. Dev.	0.18	0.156	0.081	0.043
Do you feel any social pressure due to your religious beliefs and behaviors?	Mean	0.959	0.028	0.009	0.003
	Std. Dev.	0.197	0.166	0.095	0.056
Do you feel any social pressure due to your political views?	Mean	0.969	0.022	0.007	0.002
	Std. Dev.	0.173	0.146	0.083	0.045
Do you feel any social pressure due to your hometown?	Mean	0.971	0.02	0.007	0.002
	Std. Dev.	0.168	0.14	0.083	0.047
Do you feel any social pressure due to your level of income?	Mean	0.959	0.027	0.011	0.004
	Std. Dev.	0.199	0.161	0.103	0.063

Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 7: Province-level values and variation of dependent variables

DV	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Q1	0.576	0.107	0.177	0.857
Q2	0.411	0.131	0.108	0.756
Q3	0.424	0.129	0.095	0.778
Q4	0.274	0.120	0.091	0.711

Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

3 Estimation and results

In a first step, we identify the characteristics of non-reporting individuals with the following probit estimation:

$$e_i = \beta_0 + \beta X_i + \gamma H_i + R + \epsilon_i$$

where individual e_i takes the value 1 if they both experienced a criminal incident and reported it to the police, and 0 if they did not report it. Table 2 provides a short description of the key dependent variable. X_i is a vector of variables giving information on individual characteristics, namely gender, age, education (category) level, marital status (category), and social security registration (head or spouse has registered with the social security system).[8] H_i is a vector of variables related to household attributes, such as household size and type of accommodation. R stands for provincial controls. We also include several individual assessments of the respondents related to social conditions, given in Table 6. Finally, ϵ_i is the error term. Table 8 summarizes the set of controls used in the regressions. Women are less educated, have lower rates of employment, higher rates of no opinion responses, and are significantly more subject to social pressure resulting from their gender.

The two-equation binary choice model (bivariate probit) relating reporting a case ($e_i = 1$ if reported, zero otherwise) and the questions (Q2, Q3, and Q4) related to the judicial system (denoted by $p_2 = 1$ if the respondent has no opinion, zero if he/she has a definitive opinion) can be written as follows:

$$e^*_{i,1} = \beta_1 X_{i,r} + \gamma_1 H_{i,r} + \mu_1 \; with \; \epsilon_{i,1} = 1 \; if \; e^*_{i,1} >, 0 \; otherwise$$
$$p^*_{i,2} = \beta_2 X_{i,r} + \gamma_2 H_{i,r} + \mu_2 \; with \; p_{i,2} = 1 \; if \; p^*_{i,2} >, 0 \; otherwise$$

where $e^*_{i,1}$ and $p^*_{i,2}$ are the latent variables of the two outcome equations and where μ_1 **and** μ_2 are zero mean random disturbances, jointly normally distributed, with the correlation coefficient denoted by ρ. The non-observable part of the related behavior may be explained through the residual covariance structure. A residual covariance significantly different from zero indicates an unobserved dependency between two different attitudes. Similarly, Liao (1995) uses bivariate probit to identify the non-randomness of no opinion responses. If ρ is significantly different from zero, then both responses depend on the common unobserved disturbance, and the probability of being reluctant to report a case is correlated with the probability of having a definitive opinion on the judicial system. We argue that individual background related to limited access to justice would require the correlation, i.e. ρ, to be negative and significant. Notice that this empirical model only allows us to capture the

[8] Turkey's social security system is based on first-degree kinship.

endogeneity of these two responses without asserting any causality. Establishing a causal link would require knowledge of the agents' motivation and more information on their experiences with the judicial system besides their personal views.

Table 9 presents the probit estimation results. For the full model including all controls, and considering the results for men and women separately, the common significant factors can be summarized as follows. Probability of reporting experience of crime increases with age and education level but decreases with pressure. Considering the religious beliefs of others to be important also decreases the likelihood of reporting. If considering religion of others to be important is an indicator of a preference for a communitarian lifestyle, then this may be interpreted as a preference for intra-communitarian conflict resolution, which may inhibit access to justice, particularly if the crime is likely to occur within the community. Larger household size, which is commonly considered a vulnerability factor, decreases the probability of reporting, although its coefficient becomes insignificant once provincial fixed effects are added. Overall, adding province fixed effects significantly improves the results. It is worth noting that higher provincial variation (Table 7) can also be interpreted as evidence of region-specific cultural background. A similar effect can be observed with the social security registration variable: being registered for social security, which indicates better socio-economic status, increases the probability of reporting crime. This impact disappears for women once social pressures are included, and for men once province fixed effects are included. For men, this may be a local cultural effect. For women, this may reflect their access to social security through their spouse or parent (if not married and not employed – the conditions depend on the prevailing legislation), given that registration to the social security system is based on kinship in Turkey. The significant negative effect of hometown social pressure on men's reporting of crime becomes insignificant in the province fixed effect model. Thus, hometown pressure is also a province-specific issue.

Qualitative research has demonstrated problems with women's access to justice and gender-biased practices in Turkey's judicial system despite improved de jure rights (e.g., Hatıpoğlu-Aydın & Aydın, 2016; Hatıpoğlu Aydın, 2021). In line with this, the model has greater explanatory power for women,[9] for whom more covariates are significant. For example, education level is a better predictor for women. While men's access to justice is only significantly hindered if they have no schooling, women are less likely to take judicial action if they have no schooling, primary, or lower secondary school education. Marital status also matters: married and widowed women (with a larger coefficient) are more likely to report than single women. There is no significant effect for divorced women. This is in conformity with conservative values that grant higher status to marriage while widowhood is likely to occur later in the life cycle, when women are less vulnerable to social pressure. Likewise, religious values have a negative impact for both genders, albeit slightly stronger for women. Gender-based and income-related social pressure also reduce women's likelihood of reporting crime. In contrast, men are not significantly affected by income-related social pressure,[10] perhaps because women have weaker bargaining power in low-income households where use and sharing of assets and incomes are predominantly patriarchal (e.g., Kocabicak, 2020). This

[9] According to the Global Gender Gap Index, Turkey ranked 120th out of 136 countries in 2013, and 133rd out of 156 countries in 2020.

[10] The mentioned variable corresponds to perceived pressure related to level of income. The survey does not provide direct information on any type of asset or income.

hinders the enforcement of women's formal rights, whether as spouse, daughter, sibling, or other familial relation.

Apart from a low level of education, poor economic conditions also clearly increase the probability of women being subject to domestic violence.[11] Although we cannot control for this effect given data limitations, the threat of violence may further exacerbate the pressure on women's attitudes and decisions. Relating our findings with the recent IPV literature for Turkey, Yılmaz (2018) shows that intimate partner violence (IPV) reduces women's autonomy. Several studies have exploited Turkey's 1997 education reform that extended compulsory primary education from 5 to 8 years to study causal relationships. Erten & Keskin (2021) find that education contributes to women's legal awareness measured as knowledge of legislation. The impact of longer education on IPV depends on sample and estimation specifications (see Akyol & Kirdar, 2020, for a critical evaluation of Erten & Keskin, 2018). Dildar (2020) shows that the gap in education between marriage partners matters. This effect is all the more significant as Turkey's marriage market is generally characterized by a significant education gap (albeit decreasing in recent cohorts), especially among the less educated.

Interestingly, we find that working in the private sector as opposed to not working increases the probability of reporting crime for men but not women. This also suggests that working neither increases nor prevents women's access to justice. Likewise, Dildar (2020) finds that employment does not significantly affect IPV, unlike assets, which decrease it, and relates this to the prevalence of unpaid family employment. Additionally, wage level, employment status (other than unpaid work), and occupation type may be relevant, especially given women's significantly lower education level, notably among those who did not complete any schooling level (Table 8). However, such variables are not available in the LSS for our study or in the National Survey on Domestic Violence against Women in Turkey, used in IPV research. Here again, the gaps of such variables with the partner may also be important.

Table 10 presents the results of the bivariate probit estimations. ρ has a negative sign and is significant for all pairs except for men in the case of the Q1-Q2 pair. The negative sign means that there is a negative correlation between the decision to report crime incidents and having no opinion in terms of perception of judicial services. In other words, the no opinion response is non-random and related to reluctance to report. The correlations are greater for women,[12] with the highest value for the Q1-Q3 pair about overall satisfaction with the judicial services. The correlation for the Q1-Q2 pair is insignificant for men. These results support the empirical literature on INR: omitting INRs can be a misleading strategy for social exclusion analyses if the non-response rate is extremely high and non-random, particularly regarding perceptions and attitudes towards political issues, more so for women.

[11] There is a vast literature on intimate partner violence in Turkey. For a survey and meta-analysis of the covariates, see Guvenc et al. (2014) and Özcan et al. (2016).

[12] Women tend to give higher rates of "don't know" answers. The frequency and non-random distribution of women's DK responses depends on the question topic: "Prior research on this topic has been limited by data that were non-probability samples or contained only politically-related topic domains. As a result, these findings may be inconsistent with other types of survey data, particularly with respect to respondent gender. For example, survey researchers believe that women offer DK replies more frequently than men. While this is known for questions about politics, women could actually be less likely to say DK to questions about other topics, such as family, friends, or religious views" (Young, 2012).

Lack of recourse to a formal solution (accessing justice) leaves the respondent with the following 'choices': The parties either ignore the criminal event (no solution) or find a private solution. In the first case, assuming the victim knows about alternatives to not reporting the incident, a no opinion answer implies exclusion and therefore reluctance to reveal their assessment because they are prevented from voicing the incident altogether (marginalization through forced exit). Women who experience an incident involving any conflict of interest with asymmetric gender power relations in or outside the family may face additional pressures from gendered attitudes among police, gendarmerie, or judiciary members (as is the case in Turkey: Gölge et al., 2016). Consequently, a female victim is more reluctant to report due to the risk of retaliation. In the second case, the no opinion answer can be interpreted as genuine, i.e., reflecting lack of knowledge. Here, the victim had to 'opt' for a private 'solution' by default. This also implies marginalization, especially for women given the social pressure they face. Thus, it is highly unlikely that, under such pressure, a private solution provides a better outcome for the victim than a formal solution would if there were no pressure.

Table 8: Descriptive summary statistics

	All		Women		Men	
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev
Female	0.52	0.50				
Age	41.75	15.12	40.93	15.09	42.64	15.10
No school completed	0.14	0.35	0.22	0.41	0.06	0.23
Primary school	0.36	0.48	0.37	0.48	0.36	0.48
Lower secondary education (Primary education)*	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.32
Higher secondary school (general)	0.14	0.35	0.12	0.32	0.17	0.37
Vocational and technical high school	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.19	0.06	0.23
Tertiary education of 2 or 3 years	0.06	0.23	0.05	0.21	0.07	0.25
Tertiary education of 4 years	0.09	0.29	0.08	0.27	0.11	0.31
Tertiary education of 5 or 6 years	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.14
Doctorate	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.21
Never married	0.16	0.36	0.14	0.34	0.18	0.38
Married	0.75	0.43	0.72	0.45	0.79	0.41
Divorced	0.05	0.21	0.07	0.25	0.02	0.14
Widowed	0.05	0.22	0.08	0.27	0.02	0.13
Not working	0.57	0.50	0.77	0.42	0.36	0.48
Working (private)	0.34	0.47	0.17	0.38	0.52	0.50
Working (public)	0.09	0.29	0.06	0.23	0.12	0.33
Paying rent	0.27	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.26	0.44
Household size	3.85	2.06	3.86	2.09	3.85	2.02
Incidence reported to the police (any one of the 8 types) (Q1)	0.56	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.57	0.50
Judicial process - no opinion=1 (Q2)	0.41	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.32	0.47
Fair and impartial law - no opinion=1 (Q3)	0.39	0.49	0.47	0.50	0.30	0.46
Judicial satisfaction - no opinion=1 (Q4)	0.29	0.45	0.35	0.48	0.22	0.41
Religious beliefs of other people are important	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50
Social pressure resulting from your political view	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30
Social pressure resulting from your gender	0.13	0.34	0.21	0.41	0.05	0.21
Social pressure resulting from your custom and traditions	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.31	0.07	0.25
Social pressure resulting from your religious beliefs and behaviors	0.08	0.26	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25
Social pressure resulting from your hometown	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26
Social pressure resulting from your level of income	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.29	0.08	0.26
No. Observations	8,301		4,300		4,001	

* Compulsory schooling was extended from 5 to 8 years starting from the 1997-98 academic year. Until then, the categories included ‘primary school’ and ‘lower secondary education’, for the cohorts entering education in 1997-98 onwards, ‘primary education’ refers to the compulsory 8-year schooling, including both primary and lower secondary schooling.
Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 9: Probit estimations – Average marginal effects

	All											
DV=Experienced a criminal incident and reported to police	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Female =1	0.015	0.020	0.034**	0.026**								
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)								
Age	0.003***	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
No school completed	-0.182***	-0.142***	-0.147***	-0.121***	-0.212***	-0.169***	-0.173***	-0.143***	-0.147***	-0.110**	-0.110**	-0.084*
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Primary school	-0.065***	-0.053***	-0.056***	-0.058***	-0.098***	-0.084***	-0.090***	-0.083***	-0.039	-0.029	-0.030	-0.040*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Lower secondary education	-0.020	-0.014	-0.017	-0.019	-0.082**	-0.074**	-0.077**	-0.068**	0.026	0.029	0.027	0.013
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Vocational and technical high school	-0.013	-0.019	-0.024	-0.033	0.002	-0.003	-0.009	-0.017	-0.024	-0.033	-0.038	-0.054
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Tertiary education of 2 or 3 years	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.008	0.012	0.011	0.006	-0.011	-0.014	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Tertiary education of 4 years	-0.012	-0.012	-0.006	-0.001	-0.037	-0.031	-0.016	-0.017	0.010	0.005	0.004	0.009
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Tertiary education of 5 or 6 years	0.019	0.021	0.032	0.027	0.013	0.020	0.031	0.028	0.027	0.022	0.032	0.017
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Doctorate	-0.035	-0.022	-0.026	-0.005	-0.021	-0.006	-0.010	0.010	-0.062	-0.058	-0.059	-0.033
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Married	0.028	0.030	0.025	0.023	0.069***	0.069***	0.061**	0.046*	-0.016	-0.026	-0.027	-0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Divorced	-0.009	-0.020	-0.007	-0.008	0.013	0.001	0.015	0.009	-0.014	-0.037	-0.039	-0.033
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Widowed	0.086***	0.074**	0.068**	0.072**	0.114***	0.102**	0.097**	0.086**	0.086	0.076	0.074	0.093
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Working (private)		0.034**	0.033**	0.028**		0.023	0.024	0.020		0.056***	0.052***	0.048**
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Working (public)		-0.022	-0.025	-0.011		-0.048	-0.052	-0.034		0.014	0.011	0.027
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)		(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Social Security (inc. Family)		0.041***	0.033**	0.013		0.041**	0.030	0.022		0.042*	0.039*	-0.001
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Household size		-0.013***	-0.011***	0.002		-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.005		-0.011***	-0.010**	0.008
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Paying rent=1		0.001	0.005	0.003		0.025	0.032*	0.027		-0.023	-0.025	-0.024
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Religious beliefs of other people are important			-0.033***	-0.033***			-0.040***	-0.038**			-0.026*	-0.030*
			(0.011)	(0.011)			(0.015)	(0.015)			(0.016)	(0.016)
Gender related social pressure			-0.072***	-0.068***			-0.091***	-0.085***			-0.008	0.010
			(0.018)	(0.018)			(0.020)	(0.020)			(0.040)	(0.040)
Tradition related social pressure			-0.025	-0.017			-0.025	-0.022			-0.030	-0.013
			(0.024)	(0.024)			(0.031)	(0.031)			(0.040)	(0.040)
Political views related social pressure			0.003	-0.004			-0.015	-0.026			0.019	0.007
			(0.023)	(0.022)			(0.031)	(0.031)			(0.033)	(0.033)
Religion related social pressure			-0.005	-0.014			0.010	0.005			-0.025	-0.033
			(0.027)	(0.026)			(0.036)	(0.035)			(0.040)	(0.040)
Hometown related social pressure			-0.077***	-0.042*			-0.046	-0.027			-0.107***	-0.048
			(0.024)	(0.024)			(0.034)	(0.033)			(0.034)	(0.034)
Level of income related pressure			-0.045**	-0.041**			-0.072***	-0.066**			-0.008	-0.010
			(0.021)	(0.021)			(0.027)	(0.027)			(0.032)	(0.032)
Province fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	8,301	8,301	8,301	8,301	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,001	4,001	4,001	4,001
Pseudo-R	0.0112	0.0151	0.0213	0.0497	0.0164	0.0205	0.0307	0.0614	0.00832	0.0130	0.0168	0.0572

Province level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Omitted categories are general higher secondary for education level, not married for marital status, not working for labor status, Adana for provincial dummies. Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013).

Table 10: Bivariate probit estimations – Average marginal effects

	All																	
DV (Q1vs Q2, Q3 and Q4)	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q1	(4) Q3	(5) Q1	(6) Q4	(7) Q1	(8) Q2	(9) Q1	(10) Q3	(11) Q1	(12) Q4	(13) Q1	(14) Q2	(15) Q1	(16) Q3	(17) QI	(18) Q4
Female =1	0.070**	0.462***	0.070**	0.448***	0.070**	0.409***												
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)												
Age	0.019***	-0.027***	0.019***	-0.029***	0.019***	-0.010	0.020**	-0.035***	0.020**	-0.036***	0.020**	-0.007	0.022**	-0.024**	0.022**	-0.027***	0.022**	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Age squared	-0.000**	0.000***	-0.000**	0.000***	-0.000**	0.000*	-0.000*	0.000***	-0.000*	0.000***	-0.000*	0.000	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000	0.000***	-0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
No school completed	-0.323***	0.497***	-0.323***	0.426***	-0.324***	0.300***	-0.386***	0.486***	-0.387***	0.435***	-0.387***	0.283***	-0.224*	0.412***	-0.224*	0.305***	-0.226*	0.230*
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.125)
Primary education	-0.155***	0.345***	-0.155***	0.312***	-0.155***	0.251***	-0.228***	0.411***	-0.228***	0.368***	-0.228***	0.241***	-0.109	0.286***	-0.109	0.264***	-0.110*	0.262***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.077)
Lower secondary education	-0.051	0.208***	-0.051	0.134**	-0.052	0.169**	-0.185*	0.109	-0.185*	0.075	-0.187**	0.076	0.035	0.275***	0.035	0.172**	0.035	0.223**

	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.090)
Vocational and technical high school	-0.090	-0.037	-0.090	-0.010	-0.090	0.125	-0.048	-0.132	-0.050	-0.013	-0.048	0.088	-0.146	0.029	-0.146	-0.022	-0.146	0.149
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.098)	(0.117)
Tertiary education of 2 or 3 years	-0.004	-0.010	-0.004	-0.024	-0.005	0.060	0.017	0.101	0.017	0.085	0.015	0.005	-0.032	-0.082	-0.031	-0.103	-0.033	0.099
	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.111)
Tertiary education of 4 years	-0.001	-0.217***	-0.002	-0.162**	-0.002	-0.164**	-0.047	-0.333***	-0.047	-0.166	-0.049	-0.205*	0.025	-0.119	0.025	-0.132	0.024	-0.156
	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.102)
Tertiary education of 5 or 6 years	0.074	-0.447***	0.074	-0.415***	0.075	-0.241*	0.079	-0.537**	0.081	-0.507**	0.079	-0.546**	0.046	-0.406**	0.047	-0.347*	0.047	-0.063
	(0.118)	(0.144)	(0.118)	(0.142)	(0.118)	(0.144)	(0.179)	(0.212)	(0.179)	(0.217)	(0.178)	(0.220)	(0.160)	(0.200)	(0.160)	(0.185)	(0.160)	(0.190)
Doctorate	-0.015	0.256***	-0.016	0.175**	-0.016	0.122	0.028	0.218**	0.028	0.078	0.028	0.045	-0.090	0.314***	-0.092	0.291***	-0.092	0.227*
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.119)
Married	0.074**	-0.026	0.074**	-0.037	0.074**	-0.043	0.054	0.003	0.055	-0.033	0.055	-0.042	0.130**	-0.060	0.130**	-0.040	0.130**	-0.051
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Divorced	-0.029	-0.006	-0.029	0.023	-0.029	-0.006	-0.090	0.063	-0.091	0.042	-0.088	0.113	0.073	-0.061	0.073	0.022	0.073	-0.059
	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.107)	(0.120)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.095)
Widowed	0.061	0.012	0.061	0.041	0.061	-0.005	0.125*	0.011	0.125*	0.078	0.126*	-0.001	-0.042	0.038	-0.042	0.026	-0.043	-0.004
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.087)
Working (private)	-0.020	-0.569***	-0.020	-0.726***	-0.020	-0.505***	0.026	-0.571***	0.025	-0.698***	0.027	-0.526***	-0.090	-0.522***	-0.089	-0.657***	-0.091	-0.378*
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.161)	(0.203)	(0.161)	(0.204)	(0.161)	(0.199)
Working (public)	0.195**	-0.009	0.194**	-0.039	0.195**	-0.058	0.233**	-0.006	0.233**	0.025	0.234**	0.018	0.262	-0.037	0.259	-0.218	0.260	-0.255
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.185)	(0.191)	(0.184)	(0.194)	(0.185)	(0.209)
Social Security (inc. Family)	0.035	-0.127***	0.035	-0.055	0.035	-0.053	0.059	-0.165***	0.059	-0.081	0.059	-0.112*	-0.003	-0.095	-0.003	-0.045	-0.003	0.012
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.069)
Household size	0.004	-0.005	0.004	-0.011	0.004	-0.016*	-0.014	0.010	-0.014	0.002	-0.014	0.004	0.021	-0.019	0.021	-0.022*	0.021	-0.036***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Paying rent=l	0.009	-0.069*	0.009	-0.036	0.008	-0.113***	0.073	-0.091*	0.073	-0.061	0.073	-0.179***	-0.064	-0.026	-0.064	0.012	-0.065	-0.028
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Religious beliefs of other people are important	-0.088***	-0.021	-0.088***	-0.001	-0.088***	0.037	-0.104**	-0.022	-0.104**	-0.001	-0.104**	0.035	-0.080*	-0.018	-0.080*	0.004	-0.080*	0.037
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Social pressure related to gender	-0.183***	-0.245***	-0.183***	-0.178***	-0.182***	-0.111**	-0.231***	-0.253***	-0.231***	-0.217***	-0.230***	-0.089	0.028	-0.163	0.029	0.032	0.029	-0.197
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.108)	(0.122)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.128)
Social pressure related to tradition pressure	-0.047	-0.185***	-0.047	-0.199***	-0.048	-0.068	-0.058	-0.236***	-0.058	-0.290***	-0.059	-0.119	-0.036	-0.063	-0.037	-0.000	-0.037	0.029
	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.109)	(0.121)
Social pressure related to political views	-0.012	-0.362***	-0.011	-0.279***	-0.011	-0.209***	-0.071	-0.277***	-0.071	-0.124	-0.070	-0.191**	0.018	-0.490***	0.019	-0.477***	0.019	-0.240**
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.103)
Social pressure related to religion	-0.038	-0.009	-0.038	0.076	-0.038	0.073	0.014	0.010	0.015	0.118	0.015	0.159	-0.089	-0.055	-0.089	-0.022	-0.090	-0.028
	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.125)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.127)
Social pressure related to hometown	-0.114*	0.020	-0.114*	-0.043	-0.113*	-0.003	-0.075	-0.059	-0.074	-0.183*	-0.074	-0.109	-0.129	0.102	-0.130	0.105	-0.129	0.164
	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.094)	(0.102)
Social pressure related to level of income	-0.110**	-0.225***	-0.110**	-0.131**	-0.110**	-0.069	-0.178**	-0.230***	-0.177**	-0.121	-0.178**	-0.051	-0.028	-0.214**	-0.028	-0.136	-0.029	-0.080
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.098)
Constant	-0.039	-0.430**	-0.040	-0.304*	-0.036	-0.905***	0.193	0.110	0.190	0.209	0.194	-0.483**	-0.307	-0.395	-0.308	-0.311	-0.304	-0.916***
	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.179)	(0.220)	(0.232)	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.219)	(0.231)	(0.249)	(0.265)	(0.249)	(0.262)	(0.249)	(0.294)
ρ	-0.051***		-0.092***		-0.116***		-0.071***		-0.098***		-0.138***		-0.026		-0.088***		-0.092***	
	(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.029)	
Observations	8,301	8,301	8,301	8,301	8,301	8,301	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,300	4,001	4,001	4,001	4,001	4,001	4,001

vProvince level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Omitted categories are general higher secondary education for education level, not married for marital status, not working for labor status, Adana for provincial dummies
Q1=Experienced a criminal incident and reported to police; Q2=Fair and impartial judicial system, no opinion=l; Q3=Problems with judicial system, no opinion=l; Q4=Are you satisfied with judicial services, no opinion=l
Source: Life Satisfaction Survey (2013

4 Conclusion

Demand-side analyses of the covariates of access to justice have predominantly assessed the provision of judicial services, primarily civil litigations. They have also been based on specific survey data or administrative data from populations already involved in judicial processes. In contrast, we used a nationally representative Life Satisfaction Survey to explore the factors affecting the reluctance to report a criminal incident in order to identify the dimensions of limited access to legal protection. There were several advantages of this approach. First, it allowed us to capture those individuals that choose not to take a criminal incident to court. One explanation is that many individuals do not go to court because they cannot frame their problem in legal terms as in civil litigations. However, recognizing the experience of a criminal incident decreases this probability. Second, exposure to a criminal incident is an objective indicator, unlike most subjective survey questions on judicial services. Third, reporting an incident to the police, which is the first step in the judicial process, is less costly in monetary terms. Moreover, police and gendarmerie services are more widely available and reachable than judicial services. These factors allowed us to reduce the potential impact of factors like cognitive requirements, costs, and availability of judicial services, and identify the individual characteristics and social factors affecting access more accurately.

We found that low levels of education and communitarian preferences reduce both men's and women's probability of reporting crime, women's more so. One reason for the latter finding is that communitarian social preferences increase the probability of the incident occurring within the community and the likelihood of private, intra-community conflict resolution. Alongside the importance of marital status, women's access to justice is hindered by gender-based social pressures and low income. To whether reluctance to report is related to marginalization (exclusion or reluctance to reveal preference), we ran bivariate probit estimations of reluctance to report with questions on perception of and satisfaction with the judicial services. This analysis shows that the two decisions are significantly correlated, hence they are an obstacle to voice.

In contemporary consolidated democracies, the transition to the rule of law was the outcome of a historical process of societal conflict of interest, and an efficient means of conflict resolution that aligned de jure and de facto political functions, and the purposes of formal institutions. In a majority of countries where the rule of law is weaker, even if formally adopted, inclusive and egalitarian de jure rules are rarely an endogenous response to underlying socio-political conflicts of interest. Consequently, access (demand) remains de facto constrained while the underlying unequal, conflictual societal and political norms prevail over formal institutions, especially to the detriment of women.

The gendered results of our study suggest that women in Turkey face greater marginalization than men and are more constrained in their choices. Hence, they are often forced to opt for a private solution. The effectiveness of private resolutions is highly complex: we do not know whether a private solution

produces a better outcome. Nevertheless, considering all the underlying factors that we investigated, such as religiosity or gender related pressure, a private solution to a crime incident is certainly less progressive for women's rights. In other words, societal norms may substitute for rather than complement formal institutions. Policies aimed at relieving the constraints from community and gender-biased social pressure are likely to help improve both gender equality and overall equality in access to justice, beyond quantitative and qualitative de jure judicial equity. In this respect, it is highly unfortunate that, in an environment of rising violence against women,[13] Turkey recently (July 1st, 2021) announced its withdrawal from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention.

[13] According to the We Will Stop Femicide Platform the number of women who lost their lives due to domestic violence has risen from 66 in 2008 to 410 in 2020 (http://anitsayac.com).

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